In light of the multifaceted challenge presented by China, the traditional concept of strategic denial – conceived as preventing military access to freely associated states (FAS) by third countries – is no longer sufficient. The United States must revisit the origins of strategic denial in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and retool it for modern geopolitical competition. Strategic denial must evolve from simply preventing the military use of and building within the FAS into a holistic concept, moving from a narrow right to a responsibility to prevent the building of malign influence and presence in Micronesia.

The Free Associated States – Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) – are of critical importance to US national security in the Indo-Pacific. In exchange for generous financial aid, the United States is granted extensive and exclusive defense rights and responsibilities for FAS. Of these rights, strategic denial has figured most prominently in the minds of policymakers, but its shifting interpretation has made it insufficient to address strategic competition with China.

In the opening salvo of the Pacific War, the Empire of Japan “brutally and deliberately” attacked the United States across the Pacific Ocean. While the strikes on Pearl Harbor were carried out by carrier air power, Japan’s attacks on Wake Island and the Philippines were launched from the Marshall Islands and Palau, respectively.

In order to reach the Japanese mainland and prevent the Pacific islands from being used to strike US territory, the US military embarked on an ambitious and deadly campaign to rid the islands. With Japan defeated, the United States sought a way to ensure that it would never again have to make such sacrifices. However, protecting security and access to corridors across the Pacific could be a costly undertaking. Given the high costs of building an offensive perimeter, the United States developed a different approach: the doctrine strategic denial. The United States would prohibits other states from establishing military bases in the regionallowing the United States to maintain its Pacific dominance at minimal cost.

Over time, however, the interpretation of strategic denial in the FAS has changed. Many reports today describe strategic denial as the right to deny the armies of other nations going FAS, especially theirs maritime spaces. These spaces are often identified as roughly the size of the continental United States—never mind that under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United States can only block other nations from transiting the territorial seas of the FAS, a much smaller space.

Strategic denial is not just a concept, but a specific right enumerated in the Free Association Agreements (COFA) that closes every FAS to the militaries of third countries. A revitalized concept of strategic denial is not an override of this right. The United States exercises both rights and responsibilities for FAS security. Reworking strategic denial for modern geostrategic competition would change strategic denial from just a narrow right to a broader responsibility, in partnership with the FAS, to protect its sovereignties.

To maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific and to exercise its security responsibilities toward the FAS, the United States must reengage with the origins of strategic denial, adapting it for a modern era of great power competition. The Japanese presence in Micronesia before Pearl Harbor looks fundamentally different from modern Chinese influence in the Pacific. Japan garrisoned the islands, turning them into military bases from which it could project its power, protect its homeland, and secure sea lines of communication. In its early days, strategic denial aimed to prevent any foreign powers from using the FAS for the same purpose: building and using military installations.

China doesn’t work the same way. Instead of building military installations, Beijing is building political influence. China uses a interwoven approach of licit and illicit tactics to bring nations into his sphere of influence. Nowhere is this more visible than in the Pacific islands. Although for the foreseeable future the United States need not worry about China building a military airfield, that does not mean the United States can let its guard down. China’s influence can and does undermine US security, particularly in the FAS.

The Chinese presence in the region opens up US military sites to potential espionage and subterfuge. For example, under a current loopholeChinese citizens can travel to the Mariana Islands without a visa – the only place in the United States where this is allowed. Chinese nationals exploited this to travel undetected to Guam, home to major US military installations. Even Chinese “tourists” have been found with inflatable boats as their only luggage on trips to the Northern Mariana Islands. Although China is not landing J-20s in Guam, covert activities – including surveillance – may prove just as damaging to national security.

The revitalization of strategic denial in FAS does not involve the creation of an exclusive american lake; instead, it means promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific and benefiting COFA states through partnership. China’s influence and presence in the FAS has been largely malignant. Look no further than the then WSF President The letters of David Panuelo to the Speaker of the House in the final days of his presidency, warning of Chinese influence in his country. Panuelo highlighted the illegal activities China engaged in to try to build influence and block the United States in the FSM: bribing lawmakers, using non-representative proxies to sign agreements, and directly threatening Panuelo’s safety.

An expanded responsibility of strategic denial would also have repercussions in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the FAS, which would prove mutually beneficial for the US and the FAS. Chinese Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing in the EEZ of the FAS represents an economic, security and environmental challenge. China’s overfishing threatens the long-term sustainability of the marine resources that provide the foundation for the livelihoods of the people the United States is sworn to protect. Proactive enforcement of maritime law would also block Chinese research vessels from carrying out nefarious activities in the EEZ of the FAS.

A new conception of strategic denial must consider blocking Chinese malign influence in all its forms. Strategic denial should include fighting corruption; blocking criminal activities; closing the visa-free travel loophole; preventing investments in dual-use architecture; combating illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing; sponsoring maritime awareness initiatives; promoting good governance; providing law enforcement assistance; ensuring freedom of the press; and more.

Of course, strategic denial has never lost its original meaning, but the shift in focus to blocking Micronesian waters risks US insecurity in the Pacific. Strategic denial stemmed from a desire to prevent adversaries from using FAS to pose a military threat to the United States. Today, the threat to US interests posed by its adversaries has become much more multidimensional. To protect a free and open Indo-Pacific, strategic denial must also become more holistic, not less.