Imagine walking the streets on a quiet night in Honolulu and breathing in the fresh salty sea air. Feel the tiny detonation of air pressure as an orange glow illuminates the cloud cover far off the ocean. What could it be? As you ask, the nearest skylight goes out in the blink of an eye.

Months before the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States lit up the Pacific skies with its first nuclear test in outer space: Starfish Prime. Its pulse and electromagnetic radiation damaged several satellites in orbit and destroyed electrical appliances in Honolulu (about 900 miles from the detonation point), clearly demonstrating the catastrophic potential of nuclear weapons in outer space. A year later, the US and the Soviet Union signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty, officially making nuclear weapons in outer space taboo.

Earlier this year, reports that Russia had developed a nuclear-armed anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon system raised alarm. Such an act could start a new nuclear arms race and bring outer space to the brink of catastrophe. To prevent this, the US should initiate the development of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with clauses that explicitly emphasize a nuclear-weapon-free outer space and prohibit nuclear-armed ASAT weapons.

In the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the US and the Soviet Union agreed to a total ban on nuclear weapons in space. Policy decisions and other agreements on nuclear weapons have reinforced this taboo since then, so Russia’s decision to develop a nuclear-armed ASAT system raises an immediate question: Why? Has the balance of power in outer space shifted so much that Russia really sees value in breaking such a long-standing taboo?

I would argue that the answer is a resounding “No.” Russia has as much to gain from the rapid democratization of orbital space as anyone. Where Russia – or, more precisely, Putin – sees value is in forcing others to react to its actions and gain some semblance of control.

Placing a nuclear weapon in orbit would be a direct and indiscriminate threat to thousands of satellites that benefits no one. As seen with Starfish Prime, the result of any detonation cannot be targeted. It would wreak havoc on everyone at once and could make orbital space radioactively unstable for years. However, because Russia’s footprint in orbital space has declined relative to that of the US and other nations, the risk/reward ratio of this outcome would be lower for Russia than for others. Only this calculation could explain the potentially dangerous behavior of the country.

Detonating a nuclear weapon in outer space may not benefit anyone, but placing one in orbit—or even the attitude of doing so—as a general threat would effectively force a response. This kind of risky strategy (see Cuban Missile Crisis) was the basis of the Cold War and the initial arms race between the US and the Soviet Union. Russia is simply perpetuating the same risk/reward strategy that dominated the behavior of the Soviet Union for the last century. Instead of allowing similar consequences to occur this time, let us learn from our history. Let’s bypass the crisis and go straight to the new treaty. A New START, with clauses guaranteeing nuclear-free outer space and banning nuclear-armed ASAT systems, could avoid a new nuclear arms race and establish a new paradigm for the peaceful use of outer space. Home runs.

There are those who oppose the idea of ​​reaching any arrangement with Russia, and that is understandable. To be clear, Russia’s aggressive behavior in recent years is unconscionable, and the US should not take any action that would fuel that behavior. However, as mentioned earlier, the risk/reward ratio for Russia is low and for the US very high. Even if Russia never finishes developing ASAT nuclear weapons, it would only be a matter of time before China or another nation does.

And why wouldn’t they? I don’t think it’s a coincidence that Russian nuclear postures and aggression in space have increased since the US announced the Space Force in March 2018. From announcing new nuclear delivery systems in 2018 to testing an ASAT weapon in 2021 to threatening with strikes and nuclear attacks. on satellites during the war in Ukraine to the potential placement of a nuclear weapon in space, Russia is escalating in fear. The Space Force may not have been created to weaponize space, but it certainly sends a strong signal to the rest of the world that the US could.

Russia fears this outcome and being left out.

So let’s bind Russia to another treaty. Let’s set the precedent for behavior. By leading with diplomacy and stability, the US can achieve the end it wants. We can find a way to equalize the risk/reward ratio so that the nuclear space taboo continues long into the future.

We can keep the street lights on, providing a safe and clear path to follow.

Kendall Marston is a second-year graduate student in the ISTP program focusing on space policy at George Washington University. A veteran of the US Army, he holds a bachelor’s degree in history, and his current studies focus on the intersection of national security, international diplomacy, and outer space exploration.

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