• Some observers have argued that surprise attacks are almost impossible due to extensive surveillance.
• The invasion of Ukraine at Kursk caught Russia by surprise and followed time-honored tactics.
• The question for Ukraine is whether Kursk will fare better than Germany’s Battle of the Bulge.

When Ukraine launched its Kursk offensive in August, it wasn’t just the Russians who were surprised.

Some experts argued that large-scale attacks were no longer possible in modern warfare. Any attempt to mass forces for a penetration would be quickly detected by dronesspy planes or satellites, he thought, allowing the defender to strengthen his defenses.

“The proliferation of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in the Ukraine-Russia war has created a transparent battlefield marked by near-persistent surveillance, making operational surprise difficult to achieve,” according to a BLOGS by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command.

But despite hordes of Russian drones keeping an eagle eye on Ukrainian movements, Ukraine has managed to concentrate his best brigades for an attack that stunned the Kremlin and confiscated 500 square miles at the height of the offensive.

How did Ukraine do? Using the same time honored techniques that Germany used in the surprise attack from The Battle of the Bulge in December 1944.

First came careful preparation by identifying weak points in Russian defenses. By massing forces for offensives in eastern Ukraine, this thinned the rest of the 600-mile front line, including the Kursk region. Open-source information “indicates that up to 75 percent of Russia’s ground forces, airborne units and naval infantry are deployed in or near eastern Ukraine,” TRADOC noted. And because Russian drones and other ISR systems – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance – were concentrated in areas where Russia was under attack, this meant easier coverage of Kursk.

Similarly, in late 1944 – even as Germany was reeling from massive defeats in Normandy and the Russian advance on the Eastern Front – Hitler and his top advisers identified the Ardennes region of Belgium as a weak point in the center of the Allied lines. While American and British forces were concentrated in the north and south for a final offensive in Germany, the Allies considered the hilly and wooded terrain of the Ardennes a quiet sector safe to defend with a few depleted or inexperienced divisions. Heavy forests could serve as cover for German infantry and Panzer armored forces as they advanced.

Before the August assault, the Ukrainian high command was also careful to keep word of the operation to as few people as possible. “Once the information was collected and analyzed, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, led the planning with only a few senior officers present,” TRADOC said. “The planning sessions were likely conducted face-to-face to prevent the risk of Russian cyber actors or signals intelligence discovering the plan. Media interviews with Ukrainian soldiers indicate that the incursion forces were not notified until several hours before the operation.”

To hide its preparations, Ukraine has also resorted to disinformation, such as spreading the news that the Ukrainian army would not be able to of launching an offensive before the spring of 2025. Ukrainian troops were unwitting parts of the deception. For example, “The Army of Ukraine has announced that the 61st Mechanized Brigade will relocate to Vovchansk, a city in the northern sector of the battle in eastern Ukraine,” TRADOC said. “Even after the 61st was told he was going to Russia, senior officers in the unit thought it was a bluff.”

Also, knowledge of the Ardennes offensive – codenamed Operation Wacht am Rhein – was limited to a small circle of officers sworn to secrecy under penalty of death. Allied cryptographers had broken high-level German radio codes (the “Ultra” program), but German forces used radio silence and orders were transmitted by courier and telephone. Even the name Wacht am Rhein (“Watch the Rhine”) was meant to convince Allied intelligence that it was a defensive plan to stop the Allies crossing the Rhine into Germany.

Ukraine prepared its offensive by blinding Russian ISR with strikes on Russian airfields, as well as using Ukrainian drones to destroy Russian UAVs. To delay the Russian response, Ukraine has used missiles, drones and artillery-delivered mines against air bases and command and control centers, as well as interdicting Russian reinforcements.

And this reflected the final offensive of Nazi Germany. He timed the Ardennes operation to coincide with a long period of bad weather, which grounded Allied reconnaissance aircraft. In the foggy dawn of December 16, 1944, a massive German artillery barrage disrupted American communications as German commandos — dressed in American uniforms — infiltrated American lines to spread confusion and panic.

The question for Ukraine is whether it is The Kursk operation he’ll do better than Bulge. Instead of a breakthrough that turned the tide of World War II, the German offensive ultimately stalled due to poor terrain, lack of fuel, and fierce American resistance.

While seizing Russian territory and causing consternation in Moscow, Ukraine’s offensive has failed to divert Russian forces from eastern Ukraine, and Russian counterattacks are shrinking the Ukrainian salient.

However, Ukraine has shown that surprise attacks are possible even in The age of the drone. “The Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region demonstrated that operational surprise is still possible in the conflict in Ukraine by avoiding and degrading ISR – a lesson that could be widely applied in future large-scale combat operations in other theaters as well,” he concluded TRADOC.

Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds a master’s degree in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him further Twitter and LinkedIn.