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Te Huia the result of the accident of signal confusion, the lack of engineering fail-safes
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Te Huia the result of the accident of signal confusion, the lack of engineering fail-safes

The new Hamilton - Auckland passenger train service, called Te Huia, will start in early April 2021.

Photo: Supplied / Waikato Regional Council

A signal mix-up and lack of engineering safety systems were blamed for an accident involving the Auckland-Hamilton Te Huia passenger train last June.

The Transport Accident Investigation Commission (TAIC) has released its final report into the accident, which happened near Auckland’s Penrose station on the morning of 17 June 2023.

The train did not stop at a red light because the engineer on board, despite having 48 years of experience, was not based locally and therefore did not know the route and looked at the wrong one.

The two signals were positioned next to each other and TAIC found that the correct one for the route was not visible.

They were not injured and the train was not damaged, however it did damage the junctions (a track component that provides a path for a wheel to transfer from one track to another) as they were prepared for another train, resulting in a long service disruption.

TAIC also found that there were no effective safety systems in the form of engineering controls, which automatically stopped trains when they passed through a stop signal, which were present on other trains.

TAIC chief accident investigator Naveen Kozhuppakalam said the rail sector needs to ensure that engineers across the country have good route knowledge.

“Nationally, safety is compromised if locomotive engineers either do not know enough about the routes they run, or the infrequency of journeys means they become rusty on a route. And the commission found that KiwiRail’s route knowledge training for locomotive engineers does not adequately identify these gaps in knowledge or currency,” he said.

In addition, trains in the Auckland metropolitan area had to have a common engineering solution to prevent them from going over stop signals.

“It is too complex to expect KiwiRail Te Huia, KiwiRail transport, Auckland One Rail and track maintenance contractors to each decide on their own system to mitigate the risks associated with passing a stop signal.”

Third, all signals had to be easily seen by drivers.

“It may be too obvious to say that all signals should be easy for drivers to see, but it needs to be said. Passengers were at increased risk when Te Huia’s driver proceeded in response to the wrong signal. It happened because Te Huia’s driver saw another track. signal and didn’t see the correct signal And that happened because KiwiRail ordered it with an incomplete risk assessment.

The report noted that since the incident, KiwiRail had identified two options to mitigate the risk of sightings; removing the signal – KiwiRail’s preferred option – but would require extensive re-signalling of the Onehunga junction; or relocating the signal that was overlooked to make it easier to see.