What you need to know: With growing concerns about a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, US military planners are reassessing the role of aircraft carriers, traditionally key to power projection. China’s rapid advances in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) technology mean that carriers now face significant vulnerabilities in the Taiwan Strait.

– Emerging strategies propose retreating carriers to the second island chain while relying on autonomous drones or dispersed mobile forces to stall a Chinese assault and buy time.

– Carriers could serve as strategic reserves, forcing China to divert resources to defense. This approach seeks a balance between using the carriers’ capabilities without risking the significant investment and their symbolic value.

How would US aircraft carriers defend Taiwan amid growing A2/AD threats?

As the world progresses deeper into a decade of concernmilitary planners continue to grapple with the potential of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

Chinese President Xi Jinping did no secret of his ambitions towards the island nation. If a military clash were to break out in the region, the US military leadership would now face several difficult choices about how to respond. One of the key decisions would be how to use US Navy aircraft carriers. Once invulnerable floating fortresses, the Chinese rapidly advance into anti-access/zone denial (A2/AD) capabilities make these ships face new and serious risks. As thinking evolved, more theories began to emerge regarding the potential uses of carriers.

Carrier vulnerabilities and traditional roles

Naval Strategy in the Pacific During World War II it was based a lot on carriers. Although these ships remained vulnerable to threats from shore, in the vast areas of the American island-hopping campaign they were able to protect battle fleets and landing forces while projecting power against enemy fleets and positions.

Until the last decade or so, this is the role it would have played in a conflict with China: sailing with impunity in the South and East China Seas, as well as the Taiwan Strait, to destroy Chinese forces landing and striking strategic locations on the mainland.

Major advances in both the quantity and quality of Chinese anti-ship missile systems have made this strategy untenable. Recent war games have projected that the US will lose two carriers at the start of hostilities simply because of their presence within range of these systems. Saturation of the combat zone with A2/AD systems means the Navy is unlikely to employ carriers in their traditional role. It seems that establishment thinking has begun to understand this and fight against the inertia of traditional plans to explore new strategies to defend Taiwan.

Outlining different strategies

It is widely recognized that allowing China unhindered access to the Taiwan Strait to conduct amphibious landings would lead to Taiwanese defeat. While the armed forces of the Republic of China possess some capabilities to contest control of the Straits, they are likely to be reduced to a low operational capability shortly after the outbreak of hostilities due to the overwhelming numerical superiority of mainland China.

As discussed above, US conventional forces are also at risk should they attempt to project power across the strait. This is why some leaders are looking to Ukraine for lessons make the strait a “hellscape” for Chinese forces. In this scenario, the US floods the region with autonomous aerial, surface and underground drones: cheaply made, hard to detect and extremely lethal.

The idea would be to limit the effectiveness of a Chinese landing and give Taiwanese and coalition defenders time to move assets into the region to stop a Chinese assault.

A similar plan calls for pulling high-profile US forces – such as carriers – back or to the rear the second chain of islands. In their place would remain a dispersed, mobile force “to blunt Chinese attacks and secure the Allied public.”

These units would perform a function similar to the drones of the “hellscape” strategy, attacking valuable PLA ships while taking relatively few casualties in return. While they could not stop an invasion completely, they could buy time for backup forces to reach the battlefield.

How do aircraft carriers fit into the equation?

Regardless of the strategy the US and its allies pursue, the role of carriers will need to be reassessed. The more granular aspects of the strategy have already been thought through, but there is still much room for discussion and debate.

From a grand strategy perspective, carriers would be part of a external force to assist mobile units in the first island chain. In this scenario, the carriers would act almost as a reserve force, either to cover any gaps in the defense or to exploit the gaps in the offense.

At the same time, keeping the carriers out of harm’s way allows them to act as a “living fleet” and require the PLA to devote resources to A2/AD instead of offensive capabilities aimed at capturing Taiwan.

Finally, some are considering changing the use case for carriers entirely and using them as a deceptive force to extract Chinese resources without undertaking offensive missions essential to the war effort.

Much thought must be given to the use of carriers in a conflict with China. Continued advances in technology, such as the recently launched AIM-174B, will also change the calculus around carrier strategy, and planners must stay abreast of such developments.

While losses occur in war, carriers are a massive investment. Losing a carrier would be a devastating blow, not only strategically, but also to US prestige. As such, pursuing an appropriate strategy without succumbing to risk aversion is essential.

About the author: Maya Carlin, defense expert

Maya Carlinnational security writer with The National Interest, is an analyst at the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has written for many publications, including The National Interest, the Jerusalem Post, and the Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin.

All images are Creative Commons.