Despite Western sanctions and measures to isolate Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted the BRICS summit in Kazan from October 22 to 24. Leaders and representatives from 36 countries participated, as well as the UN Secretary General. BRICS, founded in 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India and China, expanded in 2010 to include South Africa, and in 2024 added Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates.

The summit highlighted a multipolar world, with the Kazan declaration highlighting such themes as “only global development and security”. For some, the presence of numerous BRICS heads of state and leaders from CIS countries indicated that Putin was at the center of the Global South. Although an ICC arrest warrant was issued For Putin on war crimes in Ukraine, the summit showed that this has not deterred the major states of the Global South or Global East, which are trying to maximize their own interests by participating in the bloc to travel to Kazan.

Has the Western world failed to isolate Putin? Why are countries in the Global South – and even some close Western allies – interested in joining what appears to be a Russian-led alliance?

There are several factors at play. First, nation-states, as well known by the tenets of the realist school of international relations, are driven by their own interests. For the so-called Global South, these interests do not necessarily involve alignment only with Western ideas or norms. Although these states differ from the West in their culture and values, they seek common ground for mutually beneficial projects.

An example of this is the case of India, which claims to be a close ally of the West and it is part of the Quad alongside the USA, Australia and Japan, but also actively participates in BRICS. India stands alone as “non-Western” but not necessarily “anti-Western” state. Asked about buying Russian oil at the Munich Security Conference, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar said it should not be a problem for others if his country was “smart enough to have more options”.

Second, the idea of ​​a multipolar world is attractive to developing states in the Global South. Instead of placing all their trust and dependence on US-led alliances and institutions, these states prefer flexibility to have options. While Putin claimed that BRICS is not an anti-Western alliance, stating that “BRICS was never meant to be created in opposition to anyone”, for some of its members such as China and Russia, it may indeed be about balancing US power. For other members and potential members, such as Turkiye, it provides leverage in negotiations with Western partners, including the United States.

What attracted less attention in the Western media was the presence of the presidents of all five Central Asian states, as well as the president of Azerbaijan and the prime minister of Armenia at the BRICS Plus/Outreach meeting. Although they are not members of BRICS, Putin’s speech framed these states as those with which Russia “shared a common past, living in one state.” Central Asian states in particular pursue multi-vector foreign policies, balancing Western pressures on Russian sanctions and the realities of their geographic and political proximity to Russia. Their wider participation at the summit helped frame and reinforce Russia’s weakened and isolated image on the international stage.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, BRICS promotes “peace and stability” among its key targets in the Global South. While it is controversial for Russia to support such a goal, given its war in Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East and the responses of major Western powers have affected how states in the Global South perceive widely celebrated values ​​such as human rights and where and how the rule of law is respected or not.

Many states, including those of the Central Asian states that participated in BRICS, have long expressed their disappointment with The apparent “blind eye” of the Western powers to Israel’s violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza. In the media, several former UN officials have recently condemned firing against UN peacekeepers, including UNIFIL, by Israel. Israel’s own civil society groups have said their government is violating international law and that “friends of Israel” could have mitigated the Israeli government’s disproportionate response including the mass killing of civilians. Israel’s daily violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza, along with limited action by the international community to enforce a ceasefire, have fueled skepticism in the Global South about the West’s commitment to justice.

Given the lack of condemnation – let alone punishment – ​​by the West for Israel’s violations of international humanitarian law, the states of The Global South perceives a double standard in the West’s approach to justice for non-European states. This disappointment is reflected in the discourse of BRICS Plus participants, with some Central Asian states stating: “No political objective can justify innocent civilian casualties, especially among children.” For them, BRICS presents itself as “a new architecture for a more just world order” while maintaining the central role of the UN.

When challenged by a BBC correspondent on how Russia’s BRICS presidency could promote themes such as “justice and security” while Russia is waging war in Ukraine, Putin responded by citing past “unjust” NATO expansions. Putin argued that Russia’s numerous efforts to call on the West to halt NATO’s eastward expansion “was ignored” and the West continued to “build military bases” in Ukraine. The war was portrayed as a necessary defense against an existential threat to Russia’s sovereignty.

BRICS is not a military institution; it is a political and economic block. While it may not yet be a strong alliance, the fact that both democracies and authoritarian states are participating—and others are interested in joining—suggests that the organization has the potential to be an attractive alternative for the Global South to pursue national interests. From the statements of BRICS members and BRICS Plus participants, it is clear that the Global South seeks a multipolar world where no major power dictates the rules and where the rights of all states are respected.

While such ambition may be detached from reality and it may be too early to predict the bloc’s long-term influence, a realistic conclusion, for now, is that coercive measures such as economic sanctions have proven ineffective in isolating the great powers like Russia. At least, the example of BRICS in Kazan illustrates this.