On October 20, Moldovans were called to vote in a referendum to insert a new article into their constitution, making EU membership a “national strategic objective”.

The EU’s average national wealth per capita is nearly five times that of Moldova, so a yes vote seemed a foregone conclusion.

But to everyone’s surprise, the referendum passed with the slimmest of majorities: only 50.5% voted in favor of the EU, and 49.5% voted against it.

This was primarily due to a negative campaign led by one Ilan Shor, a convicted fraudster and key player in a 2014 grand theft case in which US$1 billion (S$1.3 billion) – the equivalent of approximately 12% of the total of Moldova. national wealth – was stolen from the country’s banks through fictitious loans.

Shor, who fled Moldova, is now a Russian citizen and does Moscow’s bidding. During the campaign for the EU referendum, Moldova’s internal security agency accused him of depositing approximately $15 million into the bank accounts of more than 130,000 Moldovan citizens to secure a “no” vote.

Shor’s money was also likely behind President Sandu’s failure to get an absolute majority of the vote in the first round of the presidential election, which was held at the same time as the October 20 referendum.

This forced Ms Sandu into a presidential run-off on November 3, when Russia made even more extraordinary efforts to ensure her defeat.

Moldova’s main foreign exchange income is remittances from its citizens, with up to 30% of the population working abroad.

The Russian authorities made sure that those Moldovans working in Russia would vote against Mrs. Sandu.

Videos circulating on social media showed Moldovan citizens being led to vote at Moldovan embassies and consulates in Russia and Belarus – Russia’s closest ally – in organized polls.

Since Moldovan polling stations in Russia were few, the Russians also organized flights for expatriate Moldovans to vote in other places, such as Istanbul in Turkey.

Moldovans working in the EU – most of whom support Ms Sandu – have been subjected to separate intimidation efforts, such as fake videos purporting to show Ms Sandu is mentally ill or personalized threats delivered via text messages on phones mobile.

Several bombs temporarily closed polling stations in Germany and neighboring Romania, where most overseas Moldovans live. The objective of this exercise was to restrict the number of Moldovans in the diaspora who can vote, knowing that this could affect Mrs. Sandu’s re-election prospects.

Russia’s efforts to distort the election results ultimately failed, but only justly. Mrs. Sandu prevailed only because of the votes cast for her by the Moldovan diaspora; if the decision was left solely to those living inside Moldova, a pro-Russian would now be the country’s new president – ​​exactly what Moscow wanted.

In Georgia, whose territory Russian troops invaded in 2008 to maintain their influence over the country, similar recent Russian election interference efforts have been far more successful.

The Georgian Dream Party, created and financed by Mr Bidzina Ivanishvili, another wealthy individual who made his money in Russia and often echoes pro-Russian narratives, claims to have won 54% of the country’s ballots in parliamentary elections on 26 October.

International observers and Mrs. Salome Zourabichvili, the pro-Western president of Georgia, charge that the election was marred by episodes of vote-buying and ballot-box stuffing, as well as voter intimidation and pressure, carried out mainly at the behest of Russia.

These allegations are not as well documented as Russia’s actions in Moldova. However, there is no doubt that the victory of the Georgian Dream party is a dream come true for Russia.

Nor is there any doubt that the Russian authorities will continue to devote generous financial and political resources to influence future elections in their neighborhood.

“Europe should expect increasingly open forms of electoral interference. They will become the standard and more aggressive method of operation for Russia”, says Mrs. Oana Popescu-Zamfir, a prominent European expert on Russian disinformation strategies.

“Most electoral manipulation efforts will take place long before voting day. And most of them will take place outside the target country,” warns the director and founder of the foreign policy and security think tank GlobalFocus Center.