In “Planning a post-American NATO,” Phillips P. O’Brien and Edward Stringer attempt to address the security vacuum they foresee as a result of a second Trump administration. They highlight, in particular, my proposal for a “latent NATO,” in which I establish an organizational framework in which the United States would withdraw its ground forces from Europe to shift the burden of the continent’s defense away from Washington and to the region’s own governments. According to O’Brien and Stringer, a dormant NATO could quickly become a dead NATO, because the alliance would struggle to survive unless the United States clearly demonstrated an overwhelming commitment to Europe. Without this commitment, the authors argue, the older divisions will return, with Central and Eastern Europe becoming more vocal, while Northern and Western Europe continue to have free rein on Washington. “A European security alliance,” they write, “could collapse under the weight of such incompatible perspectives.”

O’Brien and Stringer are wrong in their assessment of my proposal. A dormant NATO is not a devastating withdrawal from Europe. Instead, it rests on three correct assumptions: that structural forces will push the United States to prioritize Asia over Europe, that continued NATO expansion dilutes NATO’s core geographic interests and turns a defensive alliance into an ideological one, and that Europe free west riding is the result of an overwhelming American presence. In my system, the United States would still support the continent’s security by providing a nuclear umbrella and deploying its naval resources. The proposal never calls for a total withdrawal. What it requires is a better and more equitable distribution of manpower, in which Washington shifts the burden of logistics, armor and infantry to the wealthy powers of western Europe.

But more importantly, O’Brien and Stringer are wrong about European security in general. The authors argue that NATO could survive a US withdrawal if it reshuffled its leadership and unified. Specifically, they argue that the continent should hand over military command of NATO to an Eastern European state such as Poland and develop a joint nuclear deterrent. But their proposals ignore the central puzzle they have explicitly proposed: Europe’s strategic incoherence. They fail to accept that the continent’s “incompatible perspectives” are not the product of bad design, but the result of geography, culture, threat perceptions, offensive capabilities, industrial power, and a whole host of other variables. Such differences are irreconcilable. There can be no coherent European security alliance without Washington, because there is no united Europe and never has been.

Instead, Europe is an artificial entity, one made up of states that have very different interests. It is understandable, for example, that Germany and the Netherlands are less invested in helping Ukraine than Estonia or Poland, since the defense priorities of each of these states depend on its geographical distance from Russia – and the first two countries are much more distant than the latter. The common European security architecture is, on the contrary, unnatural. It is underpinned by American hegemony, which has led Europe’s traditional great powers to spend less on their militaries than they otherwise would, as well as discouraged traditional nationalist violence on the continent. To imagine European unity without the United States – as the authors try to do – is therefore absurd.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS

O’Brien and Stringer try to address, in a practical way, the difficult security problems that Europe would face if it were abandoned by Washington. They weigh the resources and ideologies of the continent’s largest states to determine which of them might be the best leader. Ultimately, I conclude that France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are all incapable of ruling the continent—but that Poland might be, given the country’s recent rearmament. They also argue that Europe should consider establishing a continent-wide nuclear deterrent. In the short term, they propose that London and Paris provide such a shield by giving other European states some power over their launch protocols. In the long term, they argue, the continent should create a jointly owned nuclear arsenal.

These ideas might make for good academic discussion, but they are unrealistic. Consider first the nuclear issue. The idea that France or the United Kingdom would allow another state – let alone an unelected European Union bureaucrat – to dictate their nuclear positions is fanciful. So is the idea that European countries would coordinate to develop a common nuclear arsenal.

Similarly, the authors’ assertion that France, Germany, and the United Kingdom will agree to a united foreign policy direction defies logic: Great-power peace in Europe is due to an overwhelming Pax Americana, not because its countries have suddenly become benevolent. Even though Europe’s biggest powers are now inherently more peaceful, the continent’s three most populous states are unlikely to abandon their competing strategic and economic interests and accept being led by an Eastern European country , paranoid and paranoid, which is much less powerful, financially or financially. material than any of them.

O’Brien and Stringer seem to misunderstand European history. NATO’s job for over 70 years has not only been to defend Europe. It was also to temper the European national outbursts that contributed to two world wars, in part by making it impossible for any one country to dominate the others. The only plausible way in which Europe can achieve what the authors propose is by turning the European Union into a supranational empire, with all the repressions that result from the creation of such an entity. By centralizing Europe from a federalized trading bloc into a formal imperial state, policy makers would naturally encourage and encourage centrifugal social forces. These forces would in turn initiate a cycle of political and economic repression and erode democratic rights – as has happened in the past.

THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS

Fortunately, there is a moderate option for a new European strategic architecture, one that avoids a total US withdrawal but does not stretch Washington to insolvency. Instead of trying to provide security to a continent that is largely at peace and wealthy enough to finance its own defense, the United States can act as an offshore balancer. Washington will no longer aspire to primacy in the European theater. Instead, it will allow for European rearmament and, subsequently, European burden-sharing. It will remove troops and equipment from Europe and allow Western European states to return to a pre-1990 position of strength. But the United States will continue to provide a global nuclear umbrella to NATO members and deter nuclear proliferation on the continent, a central objective American for over half a century. Its formidable Second Fleet would protect sea lanes, support the continent’s major naval powers, and continue to provide an extended deterrent — fed-up Europeans fearing abandonment in a moment of Russian revanchism.

This approach, unlike that of O’Brien and Stringer, is rooted in reality. It recognizes that not all states will face similar threats, and that if a distant hegemon provides total security, the chances of free-riding increase among states that are distant from their main rival power. Furthermore, the larger an alliance, the more equal all states become, regardless of their size and contribution, which causes the relative power of the hegemonic protector to decrease. None of these forces are beneficial to Washington.

A latent NATO addresses these dilemmas. It keeps the United States tied to the continent, controls nuclear proliferation, and maintains nationalist and imperialist urges among European powers. It restrains populism on both sides of the Atlantic with fairer defense spending and provides security for European states that cannot, for historical reasons, trust their European collegial powers. But it still forces Western Europe to do more to protect the continent than the region currently does. The simple fact is that France, Germany and other Western European states will never seriously invest in their militaries until they can no longer turn to the United States for protection. They need Washington to partially withdraw before they can better coordinate with Central and Eastern Europe.

The Europeans will surely rave about a partial US withdrawal. But in the end, a dormant NATO would benefit all its members. If Europe better shares the burden of logistics, armor, intelligence, and infantry, the United States will find it easier to guarantee European peace and unity with its nuclear and naval dominance. And NATO will eventually become closed, minimalist and defensive – just as its founders originally intended.

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