The following is a brief summary, providing key analytical findings and policy conclusions from a recently released Middle East Institute report on post-war reconstruction in Syria.

Read the full report here.

Since the United Nations announced the creation of a Early Recovery Trust Fund for Syria in March 2024, early recovery has emerged as a controversial topic among donors, policy makers and international organizations. At the heart of this debate is the definition of “early recovery”, the mechanism for allocating funds and the implications for Syria’s political transition. Concerns among civil society actors emerged that early recovery could serve as a way for the Syrian regime to circumvent the restrictions on reconstruction that the international community had imposed on Damascus to try to alter the regime’s political behavior at home. However, with normalization efforts that have gained momentum in recent years, particularly from the Gulf states and some European countriesfears have grown that early recovery could further undermine the political viability of the reconstruction card as a path to achieving a meaningful political transition in Syria.

In light of and against the backdrop of this political debate, MEI’s latest study, “Inside Damascus’s Reconstruction Lab: Navigating the Framework of Return and Recovery,” in collaboration with Munqeth Othman Agha and Muhannad al-Rish, examines the capacity of regime-controlled areas to to effectively engage in early recovery and rehabilitation. It explores the political, legal and economic frameworks that the Syrian regime uses to control the dynamics of return and recovery activities, with the aim of drawing conclusions about the regime’s broader vision for national reconstruction. Damascus was chosen as the main case study because of the extent of its destruction and the variety of reconstruction projects undertaken there in recent years.

Following the regime’s consolidation of control over Damascus in 2018, it has never implemented any kind of comprehensive framework for the return and rehabilitation of conflict-affected areas. Instead, official decisions were made at the local level by various governing entities and security organizations. This decentralized approach left returnees vulnerable to extortion by local security personnel, criminal gangs and contractors. The evidence gathered in this study suggests that regime policy intentionally restricts return and rehabilitation in areas designated for pre-conflict urban development plans, focusing resources rather on “economically viable” sectors and locations. The regime appears to view current return and rehabilitation efforts as temporary measures until sufficient financial and political capital is accumulated to continue pre-conflict urban development projects, which involve demolishing affected areas and replacing them with high-end residential and commercial developments.

Conflict-affected neighborhoods remain underserved, not only due to financial and security constraints, but also as a deliberate strategy to discourage return, thus reducing resistance to future redevelopment plans and minimizing compensation to displaced property owners. Meanwhile, returnees bear the financial burden of removing debris, repairing property and restoring basic services.

Most of the current returnees come from regime-controlled areas, where obtaining security clearances is relatively more feasible. However, the return of refugees from abroad or internally displaced persons (IDPs) from opposition-controlled areas remains extremely limited and risky. Economic pressures, such as the desire to avoid paying rent in temporary locations, drive much of the internal return. However, even for these returnees, the challenges are significant: insecurity, looting, lack of basic services, financial pressure and limited access to legal support remain endemic. These difficulties led some returnees to abandon their homes again.

Given the regime’s reconstruction plan, a large-scale regime-led reconstruction effort may do more harm than good. A more effective strategy might involve facilitating the low-risk return of IDPs from other regime-controlled areas. This approach could include small grants and micro-grants for returning IDPs, helping them rehabilitate their homes and revitalize local businesses. To make this strategy viable, the use of financial, political and legal instruments is essential. This should include supporting civil society and grassroots initiatives, along with providing legal advice to returnees. Donors must link political pressure and operational conditions to early recovery projects in regime-controlled areas. These conditions should guarantee the issuance of return and rehabilitation permits and increase security in return areas.

With a deteriorating economy, pro-regime actors are now competing for financial resources, turning local recovery and reconstruction into a race to occupy the lands and assets of displaced communities. For policy makers, donors and implementing actors, understanding these dynamics within the regime network, including government bodies, security forces, militia leaders and business people, is essential. These actors often have conflicting interests and visions for post-conflict recovery. Positive change can occur when legal and political pressure is applied, especially with the support of local people. Strengthening the organizational capacity of residents, providing them with the necessary tools, and mobilizing local elites willing to contribute to early recovery efforts are essential steps forward.

Munqeth Othman Agha is a non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute, a fellow at the Syrian Memory Institute at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, and co-founder of the Syria Urban Research Project.

Muhannad al-Rish is a researcher and analyst specializing in security and humanitarian response in Syria, with a particular focus on the southern regions of Damascus, Daraa and Suweida.

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