Qatar became the first state in the Gulf PASSED on the US Visa Waiver Program (VWP) in September, some US lawmakers again began to question whether the VWP unnecessarily exposes the United States to security threats, despite the implementation of strict security requirements for VWP participating countries.

At the same time, however, because of Congress’ long-standing interest in promoting travel and tourism to the U.S.—the reason for the VWP to begin with—other lawmakers are pushing to admit even more countries to the VWP.

Before traveling to the US, each VWP traveler must obtain pre-authorization to board a flight to the US through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), which is managed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). To do this, each VWP traveler must submit their biographical information to ESTA, which is a web-based application that checks the traveler’s information against relevant law enforcement and security databases to determine eligibility for travel under VWP. ESTA notifies the foreign national if he or she has been approved to travel, and if not approved, the person must obtain a visa before coming to the US.

Under the current system, when a foreign national submits an ESTA application, he or she is checked against the terrorist screening dataset; TECS, a system used by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers to monitor arriving travelers; Automatic targeting system; and the INTERPOL Lost and Stolen Passport Database.

Criticism of Qatar’s admission to the VWP focuses primarily on concerns about potential security risks due to the nation’s complex geopolitical situation, including its ties to certain groups considered terrorist organizations and the possibility that the ESTA system may not adequately filter all prospective travelers from Qatar, possibly allowing individuals with worrisome backgrounds to enter the U.S. without additional screening.

Critics fear that Qatar’s support for certain groups such as Hamas could facilitate the entry of people with ties to terrorism into the US, even with the ESTA system in place. Although ESTA is required for VWP travel, it relies primarily on self-reported information and may not effectively identify individuals with potentially hazardous backgrounds.

“Despite its close partnership with the United States, Qatar is a known host and supporter of Islamist organizations, including Hamas, the Taliban, and the Muslim Brotherhood,” the Foundation for Defense of Democracies said in response to Qatar’s admission to the VWP.

US lawmakers’ concern about Qatar’s relationship with Hamas, in particular, is reflected in the Senate Armed Services Committee. design of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2025. Specifically, section 1287 of the bill would require the Secretary of Defense to “submit a report and provide briefing to the congressional defense committees on the operational value of Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar , taking into account the relationship of the government of Qatar. with Hamas and other terrorist organizations.”

Al-Udeid Air Base is the largest US military base in the region. However, since October 7, several US lawmakers have encouraged the Biden administration to degrade US-Qatar relations in light of Doha’s support for Hamas. On May 1, Republican Rep. Ann Wagner and Democrat Rep. Jared Golden introduced the bipartisan Review of Qatar’s main act on non-NATO ally status. A the accompanying invoice was introduced in the Senate by Senator Ted Budd. The legislation never made it out of the respective committees to which they were assigned upon introduction to the House and Senate.

Instead, in October 2022, a group of 20 House Democrats asked the Biden administration to keep Israel out of the VWP, to which it was admitted the following year, but not after concessions from the US. Prior to Israel’s designation in the VWP, Israeli officials expressed a desire to enter the program, but faced challenges meeting certain criteria. For example, that of Israel Law of biometric databases prohibits the sharing of fingerprint data with foreign authorities. So the US made a deal with Israel to share fingerprint data only for those with criminal records.

And that comes down to something the Congressional Research Service (CRS) highlighted in a report for congressional applicants this month. CRS said security concerns about ESTA include the potential for people to provide false information on their applications, the possibility of not adequately identifying high-risk travelers through the online system, and privacy concerns about the collection and storage of personal data, especially when using information from social networks for verification purposes.

DHS implemented ESTA in August 2008. It was supposed to add a significant layer of VWP security by allowing CBP to conduct security checks on potential VWP travelers to determine whether they pose a law enforcement or security risk before boarding aircraft destined for the USA. states.

However, as CRS noted in its briefing paper, Adding Countries to the Visa Waiver Program: National Security and Tourism Considerations“ESTA only analyzes biographical security databases; VWP travelers do not submit biometric information until they arrive at a US port of entry, at which point their biometric data is run through multiple security databases.”

“Furthermore, ESTA is a name-based system and cannot be used to perform checks against biometric databases such as the Automated Biometric Identification System and Next Generation Identification,” the CRS briefing said, adding, however , that “when VWP travelers arrive at a US port of entry, CBP takes their fingerprints and photographs and verifies them with these biometric systems.”

Lawmakers and critics say the problem is obvious. If the required biometric identifiers do not already exist in a VWP country’s systems, there will be no “hit”.

“ESTA only checks biographical security databases; VWP travelers do not submit biometric information until they arrive at a US port of entry, at which point the biometric data is run through multiple security databases,” CRS said.

A key goal of the VWP was to improve standards for aviation security and travel documents and to improve the exchange of information by law enforcement agencies in countries around the world. To qualify for the VWP, countries must issue machine-readable, forgery-resistant electronic passports and visa documents that can be verified at the country’s port of entry and certify that it has passport validation mechanisms in place which can be read automatically and -passports at each port of entry. They must also report information on all lost and stolen passports to the International Criminal Police Organization and share information about travelers who may pose a terrorist or criminal threat.

“VWP supporters see admission to the program as an incentive for foreign countries to increase their security infrastructure and information sharing with the United States,” CRS said, noting, however, that “a competing view is that, despite security improvements, including Generally, barring individuals from traveling under the VWP if they have traveled to a country known as a terrorist sanctuary, the program remains a national security vulnerability.”

These measures are however only as good as the information entered. The CRS briefing pointed out that “in 2022, Congressional interest in the parameters of intelligence sharing agreements increased” after a 44-year-old British Pakistani man, Malik Faisal Akram, traveled to the US under the VWP and took four hostages at Congregation Beth Israel Synagogue in Colleyville, Texas.

During a March 2022 hearing of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Stephanie Dobitsch, then assistant undersecretary for intelligence enterprise operations in DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis, he confessed that Akram “had several criminal and potentially terrorist-related interactions with the UK government. However, none of these resulted in information reaching the United States threshold. Therefore, (DHS) is looking to reevaluate the information sharing agreements we have under the Visa Waiver Program and looking for opportunities to close any gaps.”

And lawmakers have been trying to close those loopholes ever since.

Among those loopholes, critics say, is that ESTA allows for the potential to provide false information. Individuals may deliberately provide inaccurate information on their ESTA application to gain entry to the US, despite the potential security risks. ESTA also has limited verification capabilities. The online system may not be comprehensive enough to identify all potential threats, potentially allowing people with worrisome backgrounds to enter the country under the VWP.

There’s also the issue of ‘Selfie’ verification. While using a selfie to verify identity adds a layer of security, there is a risk that someone could submit a photo of another person to gain authorization.

There are also concerns about travel agents being able to submit ESTA applications on behalf of clients, potentially introducing inaccuracies in the information provided.

And there are privacy concerns with the data collection itself. The ESTA application collects extensive personal information, including passport details, travel history and potentially social media information, which could raise privacy concerns regarding data storage and access. There is a risk that CBP may use social media information collected through ESTA applications for purposes beyond security screening, which may result in overreach.

Currently, CRS said, “debate remains whether VWP sufficiently screens individual travelers prior to arrival at a US port of entry.”

Article topics

biometric identification | border security | DHS | identity verification | national security | travel and tourism | US Govt | visa waiver program